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INFORMED REFUSAL: PHYSICIAN LIABILITY
FOR FAILURE TO INFORM OF THE RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH REFUSING
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
Traditionally, the doctrine of informed consent governed the
presentation of information about methods of treatment by a phy-
sician to allow a patient to make an informed choice. Recent de-
cisions in California and Washington have extended the consent
doctrine in order to promote patient participation in diagnostic
decision making. This Comment considers the policies and
problems underlying informed refusal in the diagnostic process.
INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades' the doctrine of informed consent has
been used to promote patient participation in medical treatment
decisions.2 Although informed consent originated in the area of
intentional tort,3 it has become a well-established theory in negli-
gence actions for medical malpractice.4 The physician's affirma-
1. The development of informed consent within this twenty year period has
been largely confined to negligence after the landmark decision in Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). In that case the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to jury instructions on negligence. The doctrine
of consent to treatment had been recognized as a defense to an action in battery
for many years prior to the Natanson decision. See Pratt v. Davis, 224 fl. 300, 79
N.E. 562 (1906); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 34, 35 (4th
ed. 1971).
2. The doctrine of informed consent is an action independent of the tradi-
tional action for medical malpractice. It is based on a lack of consent not a harm-
ful result. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 35 (4th ed. 1971); 2 D. LOUISELL &
H. WILLIAms, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 22.01-.09 (1960 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
3. For a collection of cases using the intentional tort of battery as a basis of
liability, see McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treat-
ment, 41 MmN. L. REV. 381, 383 n.10 (1957).
4. Discussions of informed consent as an action in negligence prior to 1970
are collected in Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 628, 628 n.1 (1970). For references collected after 1970, see Meisel, The Expan-
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tive duty to inform the patient about treatment choices is usually
measured by a professional standard of care.5 A recent trend,6
however, elevates the patient's role in the decision-making pro-
cess by implementing a standard based on the needs of the par-
ticular patient involved.7
Recent decisions in California8 and Washington 9 not only ad-
here to this trend, but also extend the role of the patient to in-
clude participation in diagnostic decision-making.' 0 This
extension has been termed "informed refusal." While informed
consent represents the patient's right to choose among treat-
ments, informed refusal refers to the patient's choice to refuse
tests before a diagnosis is made and treatment suggested." Diag-
nostic decisions have traditionally been made only by physi-
sion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by
Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 74 n.64 (1977).
5. The professional community standard judges the information against the
prevailing medical practice in similar communities. See King, In Search of a Stan-
dard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28
VAuN. L. REV. 1213, 1262 (1975).
6. The trend is "modern" because it was not recognized by case law until
1972 in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). It is also "modern" in the sense that it recognizes the influence of social
commentators on the value of patient participation in health care. Approximately
ten states and the District of Columbia have adopted the patient dominant stan-
dard. Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 1008 (1978).
7. In Canterbury, the court advanced three reasons for the imposition of a pa-
tient-oriented standard of information evaluation. First, the court stated that "the
reality of any discernible custom reflecting a professional consensus on communi-
cation of option and risk information to patients is open to serious doubt" because
custom may be merely to "... maintain silence." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Second, the court
found "no basis for operation of the special medical standard where the physi-
cian's activity does not bring his medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into
play." Id. at 785. Finally, and most importantly, the court recognized that
"[r]espect for the patient's right of self-determination... demands a standard set
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose
upon themselves." Id. at 784.
8. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
9. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980); Gates
v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
10. Although a review of opinions on informed consent might suggest that the
patient has always possessed the power to make diagnostic decisions, see, e.g.,
Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), affirmed per curiam, 85
Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975) (physician was required to obtain patient's in-
formed consent to a kidney biopsy, a diagnostic procedure), the patient's partici-
pation was limited to decisions on tests chosen by the physician. The "informed
refusal" doctrine would require the physician to inform the patient of the danger
in refusing a test or would require the physician to inform the patient of tests the
physician has ruled out as unnecessary.
11. The term was coined by the California Court of Appeal when it considered
Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 315, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 757 (1979), rev'd, 27
Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980), to describe a situation requiring
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cians.12 The informed refusal doctrine, however, places an
affirmative duty on the physician to disclose the information,
risks, and potential consequences of omitting or refusing a diag-
nostic test.'3
This Comment explores the validity14 and development 5 of pa-
tient control over the medical information-gathering and decision-
making processes. Informed refusal represents an inroad into the
realm of physician dominance over patients and should be fa-
vored by advocates of patient autonomy.16
ExPANsIoN OF INFORMED CONSENT As A PRELUDE
TO INFORMED REFUSAL
An analysis of informed refusal necessarily begins with an ex-
amination of the growth of informed consent. Under the inten-
tional tort theory, a physician's unauthorized treatment of a
patient was a battery-an unconsented to touching.17 Unfortu-
nately , the physician often influenced the outcome of early bat-
tery decisions and patient consent was found where it appeared
to be lacking.18 Plaintiffs eventually had more success with a neg-
ligence theory that placed an affirmative duty on the physician to
the physician to inform a patient of the consequences associated with refusing a
pap smear.
This Comment will use the term to include omitted as well as refused tests. See
supra note 10.
12. In the case of Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979), the
physician had mentally omitted glaucoma as a cause of patient's symptoms. The
new duty imposed by the Washington court required him to inform the patient of
further tests that could have conclusively diagnosed or ruled out glaucoma as a
cause. Id. at 250, 595 P.2d at 923.
Additionally, it has often been stated that a physician is not liable for a mis-
taken diagnosis, only for a negligent diagiosis. Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256
N.W.2d 379, 385 (1977). The new doctrine is consistent because the doctor's diag-
noses in the informed refusal cases were not characterized as negligent, only inva-
lid due to a lack of patient choice.
13. See supra notes 9 and 10.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 52-74.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 76-107.
16. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body ...." Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
17. See W. PossER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 35 (4th ed. 1971).
18. The administration of anesthesia was said to relieve the physician of the
duty to obtain consent in McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929), where
the physician performed a surgical operation after promising "that cutting would
not be necessary" to reduce plaintiff's fracture. See also McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Mm. L, REv. 381, 394 (1957).
procure the patient's informed consent as a prerequisite to
treatment.19
The duty to inform was initially measured by a community pro-
fessional standard.20 In Cobbs v. Grant,2 ' however, the California
Supreme Court held the use of a professional standard inade-
quate in light of the legal recognition of the patient's right to de-
cide on a course of treatment.22 The Cobbs court adopted a new
standard that emphasized the decision-making needs of the pa-
tient as the correct measure of the adequacy of the information
imparted.2 3 Such a standard recognized the importance of patient
participation in medical treatment.24 The policy of patient auton-
omy is an important factor in the decision to include diagnostic
testing within the realm of patient involvement.25
BREAKING NEW GROUND: THE CALIFORNIA AND WASHINGTON
FORMULATIONS OF INFORMED REFUSAL
The Supreme Court of California considered the application of
informed refusal in Truman v. Thomas.26 Truman involved a phy-
sician's failure to inform a patient of the risks involved in refusing
to submit to a pap smear.27 During the six-year period for which
he was primarily responsible for the patient's care, the physician
never explained that the test could detect the presence of cervical
cancer at an early, treatable stage. A gynecologist subsequently
diagnosed and unsuccessfully attempted to treat the cervical can-
cer. The patient died at the age of thirty.28
19. In Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918), the physician was
supposed to warn a patient of the possibly harmful consequences of treatment
with radiation therapy; failure to do so constituted negligence. See also McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 590 (1959).
20. See supra note 5.
21. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
22. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
23. "In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physi-
cian's duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice." Id. at 245, 502
P.2d at 11, 104 Cal Rptr. at 515.
24. "Blind adherence to local practice is completely at odds with the undis-
puted right of the patient to receive information which will enable him to make a
choice-either to take his chances with the treatment or operation recommended
by the doctor or to risk living without it." Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 RL 606, 625, 295
A.2d 676, 688 (1972).
25. "[T]he patient has a right to know the material facts concerning the condi-
tion of his or her body, and any risks presented by that condition, so that an in-
formed choice may be made regarding the course which the patient's medical care
will take." Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 250, 595 P.2d 919, 922 (1979).
26. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
27. Id. at 289, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
28. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 289, 611 P.2d 902, 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308,
314 (1980).
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The California Court of Appeal affirmed a directed verdict for
the defendant physician,29 rejecting the plaintiffs claim of liabil-
ity on the theory of informed refusal.3 0 The reasons given for re-
jecting informed refusal included: the lack of support in
California case law; the absence of an analogy to battery; the fail-
ure to show that the inherent dependence of the patient upon her
physician suggested anything other than a common understand-
ing that his advice should be followed; and the imposition of the
duty showing lack of respect for the physician's judgment.3 ' The
majority intimated that if the patient had made further inquiry,
the duty to inform would have arisen.3 2
The Supreme Court of California reversed in a four to three de-
cision.33 The Truman court held that the patient's refusal of a
risk-free diagnostic test imposed an additional duty upon the phy-
sician to inform the patient of the risk associated with refusing
the recommended test.3 4 In imposing liability, the court relied
principally on the increased duty owed by a physician to his pa-
tient.3 5 The California court in Cobbs v. Grant36 had character-
ized this duty as fiduciary in nature. The Truman court did not
29. Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, i55 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979), rev'd, 27
Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
30. The court reasoned that there was no support for strict medical liability in
California and that imposing liability would extend Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), to absolute liability by requiring the test over the patient's
objection. Truman v. Thomas, 93 CaL App. 3d 304, 312, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 755 (1979),
rev'd, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
31. Id. at 307-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 755-59. A persuasive dissent in the court of
appeal decision perceives the inconsistencies in the majority's rejection of in-
formed refusal. The dissenter was not impressed by the lack of any analogy be-
tween the failure of a physician to inform and the intentional tort approach to
consent. The dissent also reasoned that a patient who is abjectly dependent on
the physician and yet refuses to allow the gathering of diagnostic information
probably does not comprehend the implication of further tests. The dissent con-
cluded that modern medical law demands that the patient be given enough infor-
mation to allow him to make his decision as to the proposed diagnostic procedure.
Id. at 320-23, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62.
32. Id. at 318, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
33. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
34. "If a patient indicates that he or she is going to decline the risk-free test or
treatment, then the doctor has the additional duty of advising of all material risks
of which a reasonable person would want to be informed before deciding not to
undergo the procedure." Id. at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
35. "It must be remembered that Dr. Thomas was not engaged in an arms-
length transaction with Mrs. Truman. Clearly, under Cobbs, he was obligated to
provide her with all the information material to her decision." Id. at 293, 611 P.2d
at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
36. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
address any of the other justifications that have been advanced in
favor of informed consent,37 nor did the majority address the ar-
guments raised by the dissent.3 8
In 1979, another version of informed refusal was adopted by the
Washington Supreme Court in Gates v. Jensen.39 Gates
presented the issue of whether a detected physical abnormality
gives rise to a duty to inform the patient of simple, inexpensive,
and risk-frte diagnostic procedures to confirm the existence of
disease.40 The court answered affirmatively and held the defend-
ant physician liable for failing to provide sufficient information to
enable the patient to make an informed refusal of the omitted
tests.41
In Gates, the physician administered an occular pressure test
for the detection of glaucoma and noted a slightly elevated, or
positive, reading. The physician then examined Mrs. Gates' eyes
directly and concluded that her problems were associated with
her contact lenses. The record revealed that there were simple,
inexpensive, and risk-free tests available for the detection of
glaucoma.42 The court held that the detection of the abnormality
triggered a duty to inform the patient of the available alternative
tests.4 3 This duty was imposed on the physician so that the pa-
tient could make an informed diagnostic choice.44
37. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
38. Justice Clark assumed that the majority opinion, carried to its logical end,
would require a physician to explain the intricacies of innumerable diagnostic pro-
cedures. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 298, 611 P.2d 902, 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308,
316 (1980). He stated that "[r] equiring physicians to spend a large portion of their
time teaching medical science before practicing it will greatly increase the cost of
medical diagnosis-a cost ultimately paid by an unwanting public." Id. at 298-99,
611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316. He proposed that if the goal of educating pa-
tients is socially justified, the question of implementation should be left to the
Legislature. Justice Clark concluded by saying that Cobbs involved lack of con-
sent to treat and "fw]hen no intrusion takes place, no need for consent-effective
or otherwise-arises." Id. at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
39. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
40. "The first question is whether the doctrine of informed consent requires a
physician to inform a patient of a bodily abnormality discovered during a routine
examination and of diagnostic procedures which may be taken to determine the
significance of that abnormality." 92 Wash. 2d 246, 247, 595 P.2d 919, 921 (1979).
41. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 247, 595 P.2d 919, 924 (1979). The term "informed refusal"
does not appear anywhere in the text of the opinion; however, if informed refusal
is characterized as the patient's right to be fully informed before a diagnostic test
is refused or omitted, then the applicability of Gates is apparent.
42. Id. at 247, 595 P.2d at 921.
43. '"These tests need only be used when other diagnostic procedures are in-
conclusive for some reason, or when a red flag of warning has been raised by some
abnormality suggesting the risk of glaucoma." Id. at 251, 595 P.2d at 924.
44. Id. at 251, 595 P.2d at 923. The idea of informed refusal was criticized and a
proposal was made that it be limited to the facts in Gates. See Comment, In-
formed Consent in Washingtonm Expanded Scope of Material Facts That the Physi-
cian Must Disclose to His Patient, 55 WAsH L. REV. 655, 670-75 (1980).
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The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the physician's duty
in Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital.A Keogan involved a tenta-
tive diagnosis of angina indicated by slightly elevated cardiac en-
zyme tests. The defendant physician did not inform the patient of
the tentative diagnosis,46 nor did he explain the availability of fur-
ther tests to verify the diagnosis.47 The supreme court disagreed
with the lower court's48 conclusion that the omitted tests were not
simple, inexpensive, or risk-free, observing that "considering the
alternative of death by heart attack, [the tests] were relatively
simple and risk-free."49 The court went on to note that the pa-
tient's symptoms, the nature and usefulness of the tests, and the
potential severity of the disease were all important in imposing a
duty to inform.50 In dictum the court noted that a physician was
not required to disclose all tests available to conclusively diag-
nose all possible diseases.51
VALIDITY OF INFORMED REFUSAL
Support for informed refusal arises from a consideration of the
policies it vindicates5 2 and from an examination of its logical rela-
tion to informed consent. Criticism of the doctrine focuses on the
uncertainty created within the medical profession 3 and the po-
tential impact of another medical malpractice crisis.54
Furtherance of patient autonomy is the primary justification
given for the additional duty imposed by the California and Wash-
45. 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 <1980).
46. Id. at 309, 622 P.2d at 1249.
47. The three tests available at the time were a nitroglycerine test, a treadmill
EKG and an angiogram. The court described the tests, but did not provide risk
statistics on the first two procedures. It was only with the third procedure that
they acknowledged a 0.2-0.3% risk of death. Id.
48. 22 Wash. App. 366, 589 P.2d 310 (1979), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Wash. App.
583, 601 P.2d 1303 (1979), rev'd 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980).
49. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 320, 622 P.2d 1246, 1255
(1980) (emphasis original).
50. Id. at 318-19 n.3, 622 P.2d at 1254-55 n.3.
51. Id.
52. In addition to the policies to be discussed hereafter, other policies support
the additional duty to inform. These include: 1) increasing the personalization of
health care; 2) increasing public understanding of medical facts; and 3) improving
the negative public image of medical professionals. For a general discussion of
these practical considerations see SENATE SUBCOML. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZA-
TION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYsicIAN, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 2-5, 447-51 (Comm. Print 1969).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
54. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
ington decisions. 55 The opinions rely upon the Cobbs characteri-
zation of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship.56
The doctor owes more than a minimal duty to inform; he is
obliged to act in the best interests of the patient by imparting the
information the patient needs to make an informed choice.57
Patient control of the decisions affecting his body is not the
only logical basis for creating a cause of action for informed re-
fusal. Reducing the number of medical malpractice suits caused
by patient dissatisfaction,58 increasing consumer awareness by
encouraging patients to choose doctors who treat them as
equals, 59 and promoting patient compliance with a chosen treat-
ment or test are also valid reasons for extending the duty to
inform.60
The logical relationship between refusal and consent provides
additional support for informed refusal. Informed consent often
requires the physician to disclose available alternatives to a pro-
posed treatment.61 When the patient chooses one treatment from
among the others, he is simultaneously refusing the alternatives
and non-treatment. The problem with informed refusal, therefore,
is not the "refusal" portion of the doctrine. Rather, the difficulty
lies in the fact that the patient is exercising control over diagnos-
tic choices.6 2
Often a physician is unsure of the choices involved with diagno-
sis.63 Allowing the patient to participate in diagnosis may be too
55. See supra notes 23-25.
56. The four policy factors considered in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d
1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), were the unequal knowledge of patient and physician;
the right of an adult to determine whether to submit to medical treatment; the
need for consent to be informed in order to be effective; and the abject depen-
dence of the patient on the physician which transcends arms-length transactions.
Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
57. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
58. See Waitzkin & Stoeckle, The Communication of Information about Illness:
Clinica Sociological and Methodological Considerations, 8 Ar.. PsYcHosoM.
MED. 180, 182-85 (1972).
59. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 375-76 (1974). Promoting patient equality is an
important policy in the research area and in the diagnostic area because both de-
pend upon patient feedback for evaluating results.
60. See Capron, supra note 59, at 375-76.
61. For an analysis of the principle that alternatives to treatment must be dis-
closed, see Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1546-47 (1970).
62. The analogy that can be drawn to research and experimentation is appro-
priate here. The difficulty in experimentation and in diagnosis lies in the fact that
both lead to uncertain results. Nevertheless, the physician is obliged to share the
information he does have so patient participation can be encouraged. See gener-
ally Capron, supra note 59.
63. See H. WArrzKiN & B. WATERMAN, THE EXPLOrrATION OF ILLNEss IN CAPI-
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great a responsibility to visit upon him because he may be faced
with a myriad of symptoms, possible causes, and tests to deter-
mine causes. 64 The physician's duty is to provide an objective
medical evaluation of the information being imparted by the tests.
The physician can then assist the patient by placing the diagnos-
tic alternatives in perspective.65 The patient should not become a
barrier to a physician's attempt to elicit diagnostic information.
Patient participation should be limited to cases involving devas-
tating diseases whose risks significantly outweigh the risk associ-
ated with diagnostic testing.66
Informed refusal has been criticized on several grounds. Jus-
tice Clark's dissent in Truman v. Thomas typifies the concern
about the impact of the doctrine.67 Potential problems associated
with informed refusal include uncertainty in the medical profes-
sion in determining how to comply with the additional duty to in-
form68 and an increase in the volume of medical malpractice
litigation.69
One danger inherent in the doctrine of informed refusal is that
the scope of the physician's duty is unclear.70 Consequently, a
physician might be induced to recommend all possible tests to de-
tect a serious condition in order to protect himself from legal lia-
bility.7' Diagnosis itself is an uncertain science and imposing the
TALIST SOCIETY 76 (1974); Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medi-
cal Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 951 (1963).
64. See Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Substance,
ARCH. INT. MED. 682, 684 (1969).
65. Placing the alternatives in perspective would always interject some degree
of physician bias, but this bias may have to be tolerated if the patient is to have
the benefit of the physician's specialized training. For a general discussion of phy-
sician bias, see Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Forma-
tion of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 124.
66. Determining how "devastating" a result may be, and whether diagnostic
testing was relevant to the result would probably require expert medical testi-
mony, but should be judged against an ordinary reasonable prudent patient
standard.
67. Justice Clark's objections to informed refusal are set out in note 38 supra.
68. See supra note 63.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
70. For a general discussion of the development of the law of negligence as a
system of loss compensation, see Henderson, "Crisis" in Accident Loss Repara-
tions Systems: Where We Are and How We Got There. 1976 ARm. ST. L.J. 401.
71. This practice would represent positive defensive medicine, i.e., the physi-
cian acts in an affirmative, manner to defend himself from liability. For a discus-
sion of defensive medicine and its impact, see infra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text.
duty to inform of omitted or refused diagnostic tests will certainly
increase the complexity of diagnostic decisions. Initially, much of
the doctor's legal uncertainty could be reduced if there existed ju-
dicial guidelines defining the precise scope of the duty. The
courts could then gradually expand the patient's participation as
the doctrine develops into an effective means of promoting pa-
tient independence.
It is difficult to predict the effect of informed refusal on medical
malpractice litigation. Initially, the volume might increase to fill
the void created by the failure to recognize the patient's right to
participate in diagnosis.72 As the goal of patient autonomy is fur-
thered, however, we may ultimately see a reduction in the
number of legal actions as the patient shares an increased re-
sponsibility for diagnostic decisions.73
The courts should focus on striking a balance between further-
ing patient autonomy and reducing the detrimental impact an-
other medical malpractice crisis would have on society.74 The.
balancing process may depend on whether a court decides that
the doctrine of informed refusal should grow with or without judi-
cial limitation.7 5
DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED REFUSAL
Judicial inquiry into the means of developing the doctrine of in-
formed refusal should consider the problems associated with the
rapid expansion and subsequent limitation of informed consent.7 6
An analogy to informed consent is relevant because: 1) both doc-
trines have imposed a duty on the physician to communicate with
the patient; 2) each doctrine represents a significant expansion of
the prior legal theory upon which liability was predicated; and
3) the development of each is occurring in a contemporary medi-
cal environment. If informed refusal mirrors the development of
informed consent, then the new doctrine's effect on the cost and
quality of health care may be predicted by a model composed of
three stages of growth. Initially, judicial resistance to change may
72. See supra note 10 for a discussion of the void left by refusing to recognize
patient participation in diagnosis.
73. The reduction would occur in two ways: 1) increasing patient participation
will increase patient self esteem and satisfaction; and 2) patients will accept re-
sponsibility for their own choices.
74. The balance will be difficult to achieve in the face of our increasingly litig-
ious society. For a discussion of the medical malpractice crisis, see CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND COMMERCE, MEDICAL MALPP.AC-
TICE INSURANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET DURING THE
POST REFORM PERIOD (1975).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 100-107.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 91-100.
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limit the expansion of the doctrine.77 The second phase could en-
compass a period of wide acceptance and use of the doctrine. Fi-
nally, we might see judicial and legislative limits placed on the
use of the doctrine in response to the problems associated with a
period of rapid expansion.
Development of Informed Refusal Without Limits
The Washington and California decisions emphasized the dev-
astating results following the physician's failure to inform the pa-
tient of the consequences accompanying a refusal or omission of
testing.78 In view of these consequences the doctrine of informed
refusal was created to provide a legitimate role for patients in the
diagnostic process.7 9 If informed refusal follows informed con-
sent, the scope of the new cause of action might be enlarged to
compensate victims for less devastating results in other jurisdic-
tions. The doctrine could become another means to justify a large
jury award8O rather than a valid method to include patients in di-
agnostic determinations.
Rapid expansion of the doctrine may be detrimental to the cost
and quality of health care. Costs could be affected in two ways.
First, the physician may practice defensive medicine to reduce
his potential liability.81 Defensive medicine may cause a diver-
sion of medical resources from providing treatment to supplying
unnecessary testing.82 Second, the physician often passes -the
cost of increased medical malpractice insurance premiums on to
the patient in the form of increased fees for services.83
The impact of informed refusal on the quality of health care
77. Courts are often hesitant to leave the security of stare decisis in search of
a cause of action. The Supreme Court of California, however, has always been
characterized as a ground-breaker. Tribe, Trying California's Judges on Televi-
sion: Open Government or Judicial Intimidation? 65 A.B.A. J. 1175, 1176 (1979).
78. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980)
(death of patient); Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246
(1980) (death of patient); Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979)
(functional blindness of patient).
79. See supra note 25.
80. See supra note 70.
81. See Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DUKE LJ. 939, 942.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Comment, Malpractice Suits: The Increased Costs of Health Care,
8 TULSA L.J. 223 (1972).
The extended use of third party insurance, however, may cause all patients to
pay a higher percentage of their income dollar to meet the expense of insurance
may be more difficult to measure than its effect on cost. Never-
theless, many would agree that the quality of health care is often
affected by the legal duty imposed upon physicians, the practices
of defensive medicine, and the cost of providing care.84 The first
two factors are results of a fault-based model of medical liability.
Imposing fault on the culpable party is designed to serve as a de-
terrent to future substandard care.85 Physician overreaction to
the threat of liability, however, tends to make physicians overly
cautious to the point of reducing the quality of care by channeling
their energies into avoiding litigation instead of providing care.86
Cost considerations may have an effect on the quality of care in
other ways. If the cost of access to the health care system is too
large, many patients may be forced to tolerate a disease until the
"cost" of the disease to the patient outweighs the entry cost.87 If
the increase in the physician's cost of practicing medicine is sig-
nificant, it may discourage innovation in the treatment and diag-
nosis of disease, causing lower quality care.88
If the cost and quality of care are tied to the volume of litiga-
tion, then the impact on both will be minimal during the initial ac-
ceptance of informed refusal. As the volume of litigation
increases, however, the detrimental effects on cost and quality
could well trigger the type of legislative and judicial response that
limited the scope of informed consent.
The increased volume of informed consent litigation contrib-
uted to the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance premi-
protection. See King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession"
27Te "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1227-29 (1975).
84. See King, supra note 83.
85. See Roemar, Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 284, 294 (1970). But see Carlson, A Conceptualization of a No-
Fault Compenstion System for Medical Injuries, 7 LAw & Soc'y REV. 329, 353-54
(1973) (professional commiseration and liability insurance's insulating effects may
affect the validity of the fault system).
86. The emergence of medical jurisprudence articles warning physicians of
new legal decisions is one example of medical energy diverted from patient care.
See Hassard, Patient's Right to Know, BULL. L-A. COUNTY MED. Soc'Y, Nov. 1, 1973,
at 11.
87. See Altman, Malpractice Rates Drive Up Doctor Fees, N.Y. Times, July 27,
1975, at 1, col. 4. One hospital had to increase its room rates 12 dollars per day to
meet increased insurance costs. Id. at 24, cols. 2-3. See also TImE, June 16, 1975, at
50. If the costs continue to rise at this rate, the patient without medical insurance
cannot afford to be sick.
88. During the malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's many physicians were
forced to close their practices due to spiraling insurance rates. See Letter from Dr.
Lichtman in CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITrEB ON FINANCE, INSURANCE, AN COM-
MERCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE INSUR-
ANCE MARKET DURING THE POST REFORM PERIOD 400 (1975). If doctors cannot keep
their practices open for their patients and the availability of physicians is reduced,
it seems logical to assume quality will be decreased.
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ums during the 1970's.89 The cost became so prohibitive that
many physicians were forced to practice without insurance, re-
duce the use of remotely harmful procedures, or close their offices
until insurance rates decreased.9 0 The outcry from physicians
and patients not only led to legislative limitations on the informed
consent doctrine, but may also have ensured a hostile reaction to
informed refusal.
In response to the medical malpractice crisis, state legislatures
enacted laws mandating the use of screening panels9 l or arbitra-
tion procedures 92 and restrictively codified the elements of in-
formed consent.93 States passed laws that'reverted to a
community professional standard to evaluate the physician's
duty,94 prohibited the pleading of the informed consent cause of
action when the physician satisfies a legislatively defined stan-
dard, or increased the burden of proof the plaintiff had to meet.95
Informed refusal could be limited by a judicial attitude resem-
bling that of the legislature. Judicial conservativism might cause
a retreat from the policy of promoting patients' rights.96
Courts have options for vindicating the policies underlying in-
formed refusal. Courts could directly challenge the validity of re-
strictive statutes or explore other ideas for recovery.
Constitutional invalidity could be argued on the basis of equal
protection or separation of powers.9 7 If an activist court declines
a direct constitutional challenge to a statute, statutory interpreta-
tion could provide a basis for reaching a result consistent with the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review
Boards, 46 TENN. L. REV. 607, 612 (1979).
92. See Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, 1: Technical
Analysis, in HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ComMssIoN ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE, 217 app. (1973).
93. "In any event, whether clearly stated or thinly disguised, the purpose of
the [state] legislation was to make it more difficult for patients to recover in suits
brought by them against their physicians." Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to
Medical Treatment: Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Purr. L. REV. 407, 415
(1980).
94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6852(a) (2) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.46(3) (a) (1) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 39.4304 (1977); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.40-320(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.21.13(a) (1) (Supp.
1981).
95. See Curran, Informed Consent, Texas Style: Disclosure and Nondisclosure
by Regulation, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482 (1979).
96. Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 650, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1976).
97. See Comment, supra note 91, at 614-32.
policies supporting informed refusal.9 8 The difficulty with judicial
activism is that an activist court may be subjected to intense pub-
lic and legislative scrutiny.9 9 This scrutiny may inhibit any at-
tempts to expand informed refusal.
Those attempting to limit rapid development of a legal doctrine
.often overlook the justifications supporting the origin of the doc-
trine.100 A more reasonable proposal might be to avoid the
problems associated with uncontrolled extension of recoveries
based on informed refusal.
Controlling the Growth of Informed Refusal
In order to avoid the pitfalls of unchecked growth, the doctrine
of informed refusal must utilize the best features of the California
and Washington cases. Informed refusal can borrow its standards
from the law of informed consent'O' but should be limited to diag-
nostic situations with potentially devastating results. 0 2
The duty can arise if a patient refuses a risk-free test the physi-
cian recommends. The duty can also arise as to available tests if
a physical abnormality, combined with an evaluation of the pa-
tient's symptoms, suggests that risk-free testing is indicated. The
scope of the duty should focus on the nature of the tests involved,
the potential for significant harm, the physician's experience with
the patient's symptoms and medical history, and the needs of the
particular patient.
98. Indeed, even the Washington Legislature attempted to retreat to a restric-
tive standard with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975). Statutory interpreta-
tion enabled the Washington Supreme Court to avoid the statute in Gates. See
generally Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL L REV. 151 (1981).
99. See Tribe, Trying California's Judges on Television" Open Government or
Judicial Intimidation?, 65 A.B.A. J. 1175-79 (1979). For a contrary view see Ga-
lanter, Palen & Thomas, The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 737 (1979).
100. The legislative response to physician outcry may represent a retreat from
many of the advances made in the informed consent area. Meisel & Kabnick,
supra note 93, at 563, conclude that the 'most significant among the effects that
some of the statutes may have is that they will preclude the possibility of judicial
liberalization of common-law rules in a manner that might favor patients" (em-
phasis added).
101. See D. LOuISELL & H. WILlIAMS, MEDICAL M.ALPRACTICE § 22.01-.09 (1960 &
Supp. 1980) for a description of the different standards that could be utilized for
evaluating physician disclosure.
102. This limit is imposed to prevent the doctrine of informed refusal from be-
coming merely a supplemental pleading to justify a request for astronomical dam-
ages. The doctrine should be used to promote patient recovery when the remedy
under more traditional causes of action is absent. This exclusive use of informed
refusal would encourage courts to crystallize the elements of the doctrine so that
physician uncertainty can be reduced.
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The risk-free and conclusive nature of the tests 03 involved
should be a significant factor in the decision to inform. Initially
the doctrine should be confined to risk-free testing to help over-
come judicial and medical resistance to change. 0 4 The tests
should also be relatively conclusive in order to avoid causation
problems. If the tests could not have significantly added to the di-
agnostic process, their omission should not create informed re-
fusal liability.O5
Expert medical testimony should be introduced as to whether
the potential severity of the result justified the use of tests not
classified as risk-free, simple, or inexpensive. Therefore, a balanc-
ing test might focus on the foreseeability of the harm versus the
nature of the tests. The balance would be tipped in favor of the
patient if he could show that his particular needs, which the phy-
sician knew of,106 increased the significance of the result. But the
physician should be allowed to testify as to medical factors such
as the patient's history of disease, his own medical experience,
and the incidence of the disease involved in order to create a de-
fense to liability based on therapeutic privilege.lOV
The balancing test should seek to further patient autonomy
while recognizing the physician's diagnostic and legal uncer-
tainty. If a physician is sufficiently concerned about a condition
that he recommends a test, his duty to inform would be easier to
find. If a physician has only an abnormality upon which to make
103. Although experts may disagree as to whether tests are risk-free and con-
clusive, the designation may be a useful one in determining a line of causation.
104. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
as an example of adherence to legal precedent as the motivating factor in judicial
decision-making.
105. See Comment, Informed Consent in Washington.: Expanded Scope of Mate-
rial Facts That the Physician Must Disclose to His Patient, 55 WASH. L REV. 655,
670-75 (1980).
106. If the physician is not aware of a patient's needs he cannot respond to
them. The physician may, however, be able to determine some patient fears of a
particular condition by examining the patient's medical history.
107. Therapeutic privilege represents the physician's defense of community
practice to justify non-disclosure of some risks when therapy may be jeopardized.
For a history and analysis of therapeutic privilege, see Meisel, The "Exceptions" to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L REV. 413, 460-70. For a detailed analysis of
the problems of therapeutic privilege with regard to cancer patients, see Com-
ment, When the Truth Can Hurt: Patient Mediated Informed Consent in Cancer
Therapy, 9 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L REV. 143, 184-96 (1979).
his decision to omit a test, more weight should be placed on the
medical expertise of the physician.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of informed refusal offers an opportunity for in-
creased patient involvement in the diagnostic arena. The courts,
however, should be cognizant of the apprehensions of the medical
profession so that the fear of a malpractice crisis does not destroy
the effective use of the doctrine. The physician must be careful
not to base his practice on avoiding legal liability. Finally, the pa-
tient must strive to educate himself about the processes and ab-
normalities associated With his body and learn to evaluate the
information imparted by his partner in health care-the
physician.
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